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Retirement Responses
to Early Social Security Benefit Reductions
Olivia S. Mitchell and John W. R. Phillips

It has been suggested that cutting early Social Security benefits might alleviate
the solvency problems facing our national old-age retirement system, since most
American workers retire early by filing for Social Security benefits at age 62 (USGA0,
1999: 18). While an early retirement benefit cut could save the system money, it might
also impose hardship on some who cannot continue to work. Alternatively, reducing
early retirement benefits might induce changes in retirement behavior, inducing some
workers to stay on the job to the normal retirement age, while perhaps prompting others
to seek Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits. This paper seeks to identify
who would be affected by reducing early Social Security benefits, and what potential
retirement responses might be anticipated from such a policy change.
Many policymakers appear to believe that retirement patterns would change if
early Social Security retirement benefits were reduced. Thus the US General
Accounting Office (1999: 2) recently observed that if the early retirement age were
raised, “[m]ore older workers would be likely to apply for disability benefits because
benefits for retired workers would fall relative to these programs’ benefits for the
disabled.” Similarly, the Social Security Trustees stated that more workers would file for
DI in the future, in response to the raising of the normal retirement age under Social
Security beyond age 65 (Board of Trustees, 2000). Despite the apparent consensus
among policymakers, there is very little evidence on the size and direction of potential
worker responsiveness. One study examined age-62 retirees in the HRS and
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concluded that eliminating early benefits would not impose undue burdens on the older
population (Burkhauser et al., 1996).1 However that analysis excluded those receiving
disability benefits so it is not informative about the possibility of people switching from
an early to a DI retirement pathway. Below, we provide new evidence on the
characteristics of people taking alternative paths into retirement and the likelihood of
their responsiveness to this policy change.
In what follows, we first review prior literature and next examine the
sociodemographic and economic characteristics of older workers on the verge of
retirement. We evaluate how future income and leisure opportunities vary as a function
of the retirement pathways open to them, focusing both on eligibility patterns for social
insurance programs as well as peoples’ levels of other wealth from private sources,
namely pensions and financial assets. Next we measure how reducing early Social
Security benefits might alter workers’ expected retirement wealth and indicate which
kinds of older people would be most affected by this change. Then we estimate a
behavioral model of how retirement outcomes respond to differences in older workers’
wealth, job, demographic characteristics, and health conditions. Finally these estimates
are used to simulate how peoples’ behavior might change if early Social Security
benefits were to be eliminated.

Previous Research
There are several threads in the economics literature relevant to the topic of
older workers and Social Security benefits. One debate, launched by Parsons (1980),
attributed most of the post-WWII decline in men’s labor-force participation to the Social
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Security DI program. His conclusion was controversial because several other changes
in public and private pensions occurred around the same time, thus confounding the
results (Bound, 1979; Haveman and Wolfe 1984). Subsequent research queried
whether DI enrolment patterns might be due to deteriorating health of older workers.
While the research found that health problems do influence older workers’ retirement, a
time series analysis concluded that older workers are healthier now than in previous
decades, and few early retirees are currently in very poor health.2 A second literature
relevant to this topic has explored econometric issues surrounding applications to the DI
program but does not typically control for the influence of employer-provided benefits on
retirement choices.3 Yet a third strand of labor economics research focuses on how
privately-provided pension and retiree health insurance influence retirement choices,
but these studies do not generally account for Social Security DI benefits influencing
workers’ retirement behavior.4
In our assessment, prior studies offer only a partial picture of the economic
opportunities available to older workers as they contemplate alternative paths into
retirement. This is mainly because they tend to cast the labor supply behavior of
interest – movement out of the labor force – as a one-period outcome, though in
principle the retirement decision should be seen as a life cycle decision. Accordingly,
they relate one-period labor supply measures to one-period measures of benefits. As
an example, Gruber (1996) analyzed how Canadian men’s labor force participation
rates changed when one province raised DI benefits by 32 percent. His model relates
benefits in a given year to men’s labor force participation rates in that same year, and
he concludes that the benefit change cut participation by 3 percentage points, from 80
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to 77 percent. More generally, one should test whether lifetime benefit streams
associated with different pathways into retirement influence retirement outcomes.
A life cycle perspective would therefore pose the decision to seek DI benefits as
responsive not to the benefit amount payable in any single year, but rather to the stream
of future expected benefits from taking the DI path versus other available retirement
options. Thus a more general approach would allow workers’ retirement choices to
depend on a comparison of expected wealth available from a range of retirement
pathways or options (Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Mitchell and Fields, 1987).5 One recent
study that did adopt a life-cycle perspective in the DI context assessed how West
German early retirement incentives interacted with that nation’s disability program
(Borsch-Supan, 1999). This study used a discrete choice model of retirement among
men age 55-70, and it linked retirement choices to a comparison of the wealth value of
disability and nondisability pensions. The formulation was similar in spirit to what we do
below, with a key difference being that the older workers’ budget constraint is collapsed
into a single variable. By contrast, here we model separately the value of alternative
retirement pathways. Hence, that study overlooks the possibility that a worker might go
on to file for normal retirement at some later date, instead of taking either early or
disability retirement. Our approach is more general, allowing for people to move across
various retirement pathways.

Retirement Incentives in the US Social Security and Disability Insurance System
In order to evaluate how retirement and disability benefits influence retirement
decisions in the U.S., it is essential to understand how workers become insured and
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what benefits can be received under the US Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance system (OASDI). As we shall show, the eligibility and benefit rules are
relatively complex, and they interact in complicated ways with workers’ earnings and
employment histories.6
The Rules
Most older American workers are insured for both old-age and DI benefits, but
coverage is by no means uniform across people at different ages. Program rules
specify that Social Security retirement benefits are payable only to workers who have
contributed long enough to be “fully insured” and who have attained at least age 62,
when early retirement is current permitted.7 Alternatively, Social Security disability
benefits are payable only to those “fully insured for disability purposes”; this requires
that the worker must have earned 20 QC’s during the last 40 calendar quarters ending
in disability. 8 In other words, any given worker might be both fully nor disability insured,
he could be fully but not disability insured, or he could be neither.9 As we shall show,
variations in eligibility over the lifetime are quite interesting in our data.
Benefit computations use yet a different set of rules. Computing Social Security
ER and NR benefits for a fully insured worker requires determining the Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME) and his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA).10 The monthly
benefit amount depends on the worker’s retirement age; if he has attained normal
retirement age (NR), defined as age 65 for our respondents, his benefit equals his PIA.
If retirement occurs before NR, the benefit is reduced by 5/9 of a percent per month
below that age. Hence, someone taking benefits at the early entitlement age of 62 (ER)
would receive 80 percent of the full PIA for the remainder of his life. The DI benefit
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equals the eligible worker’s PIA; that is, the annual DI and the NR benefits are the same
though the DI benefit is payable at a younger age.11 Hence retiring at age 62 on DI
would provide a Social Security benefit 20 percent larger than the ER benefit.12
However applying for DI takes time and effort, and benefits are not always granted.
This probabilistic benefit award must therefore be taken into account in assessing one’s
expected value of retiring on disability. 13
Retirement Pathways in the HRS
An understanding of the economic opportunities associated with alternative paths
to retirement requires us to model individual workers’ budget constraints while taking
into account actual program rules. To better understand the actual impact of these
rules for real workers, we derived an extract from the nationally representative Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel survey of older American households initially
interviewed as they were on the verge of retirement (the full sample was age 51-61 in
1992, along with their spouses of any age). This survey is invaluable for our purposes,
inasmuch as it contains extensive and detailed information on demographic, health,
wealth, income, and employment data for respondents and their spouses. The HRS is
especially appropriate for this purpose because respondent records may be linked to
administrative data on Social Security earnings and pension plan provisions.14 This
linkage allows us to compute respondents’ eligibility status for benefits as well as the
likely benefit amounts that a worker might receive for selecting the early, normal, or
disability benefit path.
The period we study spans the eight years between 1992 and 1998.15 In order to
observe completed retirement transitions for our sample, the analysis examines those
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persons age 57-61 at baseline in 1992 who have a match to Social Security earnings
and benefits data and were not receiving a benefit from Social Security (1,843); by the
1998 wave, this older half of the HRS age-eligible sample attained age 64-67. This
enables us to determine, for each respondent, which of three possible retirement paths
was taken. These are defined as:
htook disability retirement (DR) prior to age 65;
htook early retirement (ER) at or between ages 62 and 64; or
htook normal retirement (NR) at or after 65.
Though many sample respondents are eligible for Social Security benefits, some are
not for a variety of reasons. Because this analysis focuses on changes in benefit-taking
behavior, we accordingly delete from the analysis sample those 299 respondents who
were never insured for DI and either ER or NR over the relevant period.16
Table 1 summarizes baseline sociodemographic characteristics for the sample in
the first column. We also provide summary measures according to the retirement path
subsequently chosen (drawn from Waves 2 through 4 of the panel). One interesting
fact is that respondents who later became DR recipients were less well educated (52
percent had less than high school versus 24 percent overall), more heavily black (16
percent versus 7 percent overall) and nonmarried (33 percent versus 23 percent), and
had more baseline health problems than for the group as a whole (51 percent claim
health is fair or poor, versus 13 percent overall). Put differently, those who eventually
selected early or normal retirement were both healthier and better educated than those
who ended up on DR. Furthermore, those who eventually took early retirement had
sociodemographic characteristics quite similar to those who took normal retirement.
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Table 1 here
Retirement Pathways and Retirement Wealth
Next we examine the budget constraint facing each respondent in the sample.
Ex-ante or anticipated wealth values associated with each of the three retirement paths
appear in Table 2.17 Since the analysis contains only respondents insured for at least
two Social Security benefits, it is interesting that, at baseline, 15 percent of the entire
sample was not DI-insured.18 This fraction varies by eventual retirement path: almost
all of those later electing disability retirement were DI-insured at baseline, but 18
percent (12 percent) of the ER (NR) group was not DI insured at baseline.
Table 2 here
Peoples’ lack of insured status results from erratic work histories, and peoples’
insured status can change over time, as is shown in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, men in
the HRS sample are much more likely to be insured for both OA and DI purposes from
the age of about 30, with little change after that; old-age insured rates for men stand at
around 95 percent from age 40 on. Women are far less likely to be covered for own oldage benefits throughout their careers, with old-age coverage status never exceeding 80
percent. Nevertheless, additional years of work into the 50’s and 60’s continue to
enhance women’s insured status at the margin. Turning to insured status for DI, it
reaches a maximum during men’s prime-age working years but then falls to around 80
percent from age 50 on. By contrast, women’s DI coverage status continues to rise over
their worklives but never rises above 60 percent, a full 20 percentage points below
men’s insured status rates.
Figure 1 here
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More detail on insured status patterns appears in Figure 2, where we relate
insured status for OA and DI benefits to early retirement wealth. The results suggest
that those in the lowest wealth decile also have the lowest incidence of OASDI insured
status: about half of those in the lowest decile are DI-insured, and about two-thirds are
OA-insured. Those in the next-highest wealth decile are much more likely to be insured
for both OA and DI benefits (about 70 and 86 percent respectively). It is perhaps not
surprising that the group least likely to be eligibile for Social Security benefits is also the
one with lowest retirement wealth.
Figure 2 here
Three implications follow from these findings. First, older workers are far from
universally eligible for Social Security old-age benefits, and those with little retirement
wealth are the least likely to be insured. The fact that many older people are ineligible
will influence how responsive one might expect the older population to be, to cuts in
early Social Security benefits. Second, some who are eligible for old-age retirement
benefits will never be eligible for Social Security DI benefits, and hence would not be
expected to respond to early benefit cuts by filing for DI. Third, peoples’ insured status
for both old-age and DI benefits changes over time, so any given change in benefit
availability could have little effect in a given year, but it might have a larger effect in
some later year when they become eligible.
For each of the three retirement paths considered here, we have computed the
present value of wealth anticipated from Social Security as well as total wealth,
including financial assets, housing assets and pensions. Table 2 shows that anticipated
Social Security wealth is quite similar for those who subsequently choose early and
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normal retirement, but it is far lower for those who later become DR retirees. For ER
and NR the present value of Social Security benefits is on the order of $162-$174,000
(for the median 10 percent). But having lower eligibility levels and a reduced chance of
obtaining DI even if eligible (assumed here to be 49 percent, the population average)
reduces expected wealth under the DI alternative to about $90,000 over the entire
sample.19
Table 2 also highlights the powerful role of employee benefits in workers’ budget
constraints, a factor overlooked in previous DI studies. That is, at baseline almost half
of the HRS respondents had employer-provided health insurance coverage; 44 percent
had access to disability benefits through their employers; over two-fifths had companyprovided retiree health insurance and long-term disability coverage; and 68 percent had
a company pension (including those from prior jobs). This is important since prior
research shows that defined benefit pension plans impose quite nonlinear benefit
accrual paths (Gustman et al., 1999), and provide greater rewards for retiring at one
age than some other age. In the case of defined contribution pension plans, benefit
accrual patterns are much smoother, changing relatively less as the worker delays
retirement. Because company pension accrual paths differ so widely, it is invaluable to
have HRS-linked information on the pension algorithms specific to the particular firms
employing the surveyed respondents.20 Accordingly we characterize covered workers’
budget constraints for early, normal, and disability retirement by computing the
expected present value of lifetime private pension and disability benefits if the employee
worked to age 62 and retired, or if he worked to age 65 and then retired, or if he took
the company disability benefit.21 Table 2 shows that the median 10 percent of pension
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wealth appears relatively low for the entire sample ($55,000-57,000), but this obscures
the fact that many people lacked pension coverage or had low benefits.22
Summing all the relevant elements of the budget constraint, we find that the total
expected retirement wealth for persons in this sample ranges from $450,000 to
$610,000, depending on the retirement pathway chosen. Specifically, a HRS
respondent in the median 10 percent could anticipate a present value of DR wealth of
$451,000; the ER path by contrast is worth about $522,000; and the NR path around
$611,000.23 There is much heterogeneity across subgroups in the sample, of course.
For instance, DR wealth for those who eventually take DR is about 35 percent less than
the full sample value ($334,000 versus $451,000). DR retirees also have less housing
wealth and fewer other financial assets at baseline. Those who eventually elect early
benefits (normal benefits) have about 35 percent (50 percent) more total wealth. We
also compute the present value of anticipated earnings if these respondents were to
remain employed. Projected earnings are highest for those who end up working the
longest. A lesson from Table 2 is the fact that Social Security benefits are only one of
several sources of old-age support. That is, retiring early without Social Security ER
benefits would be feasible for people having substantial non-Social Security assets such
as company-provided pensions and own financial wealth.24
How Would Cutting Early Social Security Benefits Alter Retirement Wealth?
If Social Security early retirement benefits were to be cut, a question arises as to
how such a policy change might affect the wealth value of alternative paths to
retirement. An initial answer to this question appears in Figure 2, where we compare
the current distribution of total early retirement wealth with one that might result from ER
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benefit cuts. This “thought experiment” is one where retirement wealth is recomputed
for sample HRS respondents on the assumption that the present value of ER benefits
was reduced by $25,000 while other sources of wealth remain the same.25
It is of interest to note that this experiment has the largest absolute dollar impact
on people at the top of the wealth distribution: that is, the wealth value of retiring at 62
would fall by approximately $25,000 for someone in the top wealth decile, and it would
fall by less for someone in a lower wealth decile, since the benefit is less. But as Figure
3 indicates, the percentage change is largest (20 percent) among the least wealthy and
smallest (less than 1 percent) for the wealthiest sample members. This is consistent
with previous evidence that Social Security benefits comprise a larger component of
retirement wealth among the least well-to-do (Moore and Mitchell 1999), and so a
benefit cut would have the largest impact on the less wealthy in percentage terms.
Figure 3 here
A descriptive regression in Table 3 indicates how this wealth change due to a
reduction in early Social Security benefits would vary with respondent characteristics.
The table reports correlates of the ratio of post- to pre-cut wealth and indicates that
those experiencing relatively large reductions in ER wealth would be blacks, the less
educated, and those in poor health. By contrast, married people would face a smaller
wealth reduction, along with those having company-provided pensions. Those fully
insured for SSDI purposes would experience a smaller dollar losses from the
hypothetical benefit cut.26
Table 3 here
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Estimation Methodology and Results
We turn next to the estimation of empirical parameters for a behavioral retirement
model, as a function of the economic values of the alternative retirement pathways that
people face near retirement.
The Estimation Model
Our model posits that each retirement path j (j=DR, ER, NR) has associated with
it an expected present value (YRETj), and leisure associated with that choice (Lj).27 For
a single individual deciding which of several retirement paths to take, the wealth
associated with a given path is the sum of his nonlabor wealth (Wa), potential earnings
(E) up to age R, and retirement benefits from company pensions and Social Security
from age R on (P and SS):
t

t

 + [SS (R, ij) + P (R, ij)]⋅ s(t) ⋅  1
,
(1) YRETij (R) =Wia +∑E(t, ij) ⋅ s(t) ⋅  1
∑
t
t
(
1
+
r
)
(
1
+
r
)





 R,D

a, R
where r is a discount factor and s(t) is the probability of surviving an additional year.
Benefits are subscripted i for each individual and j by path choice; income values
depend on whether the individual contemplates taking the DR, the ER, or the NR path.28
Assuming a general utility function with arguments retirement wealth and leisure
(retirement years remaining), and a person-specific disturbance term distributed
extreme value, the empirical equation for estimation takes the form:
( 2) P(Yi = j ) =

exp[αLij + βYRET ij ]

∑ j =1 exp[αLij + βYRETij ]
J

.

To predict the probability that choice j=1 would be selected, estimated
coefficients may be used to calculate the baseline probabilities for any given model:
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(3)

P(Yi = 1) =

exp[ αˆLi1 + βˆYRET i1 ]
3
∑ j=1 exp[αˆLij + βˆYRET ij ]

Calculating the change in probability of the first path associated with a “policy” that
changes the value of one of the RHS variables, such as a $25,000 reduction in the
present value of early retirement wealth, requires computing a variable POLICY equal to
YRET when j=1 or 3 and equals max(YRET-25,000, 0) if j=2. Then we replace YRET in
(3) with POLICY and calculate:
( 4)

P ′(Yi = 1) =

exp[αˆLi1 + βˆPOLICYi1 ]
.
3
ˆPOLICY ]
ˆ
exp[
α
L
+
β
∑ j=1
ij
ij

The effect of the policy on the probability of accepting path 1 is (4) minus (3):
(5) dP POLICY = P ′(Yi = 1) − P(Yi = 1) .

Estimated Parameters
Estimated conditional Logit coefficients for the main and three alternative models
of the determinants of retirement pathway choice appear in Table 4. Column 1 controls
only on path-specific retirement wealth and leisure, consistent with a utility-based
formulation. The second column adds an interaction term between leisure and poor
health, in this case measured by self-reported health being “fair” or “poor”.29 The third
column uses an alternative definition of poor health, namely whether the respondent
has any impairment limiting his activities in daily living (AnyADL). Finally, the fourth
column indicates whether the employee had three job-related benefits: on-the job health
insurance, retiree health insurance, and disability insurance.
Table 4 here
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The results for Model (1) confirm, consistent with expectations, that wealth has a
positive and statistically significant effect. This implies that that those with more wealth
tend to retire earlier, rather than working later. This pattern is repeated in Models (2)
and (3), with coefficient estimates being quite stable in magnitude. Model (4) interacts
wealth with job benefits, and the statistically significant wealth terms are all positive.
Across all four models, the effect of leisure is also positive, but is statistically
insignificant. These findings – that wealth and leisure have positive utility weights – are
consistent with evidence from prior studies using similar models but relying on older
data (Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Mitchell and Fields 1987). The more flexible
specification in columns 2-4 suggest that people reporting themselves to be in poor
health value leisure differently than those in better health but the estimated effect is
statistically insignificant (Model 2). The response is similar when other health measures
are used instead.
Turning to the controls on job-based benefits, the results prove interesting (Model
4). In principle, one could associate these benefits with additional wealth particular to
each retirement pathway and worker. Since the HRS dataset does not indicate a
worker’s health or disability plan generosity, this option is not available. On the other
hand, omitting these plans could bias coefficients on included variables. To check on
this possibility, we interact wealth with employer-provided benefits, and it does appear
that the wealth effect is more positive for those with job-based health and disability
insurance. Having retiree health insurance has no additional impact.30
Assessing Estimated Response Parameters
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Because one cannot easily interpret Logit coefficients, estimated response
parameters for various changes in explanatory variables are depicted in Table 5.31 To
obtain these we predict changes in probabilities of selecting each of the retirement
paths for each person in the sample and average over relevant categories. The results
imply that an across-the-board wealth increase of $25,000 would induce more people to
select both the DR and ER paths, and fewer people would work on to the normal
retirement age. The estimated size of the responses is small however, with the
probabilities changing by less than 0.01. A one-year increase in leisure could also be
seen as an upward shift in the budget constraint, and here too the effect would be to
retire earlier; again the estimated responses are small. If people were to be in poor
instead of good health, they are more likely to be on the DR path, with the likelihood
rising by 0.022 or twice as much as moved into ER. Finally, having job-linked benefits
such as health and disability insurance tends to encourage longer worklives, reducing
the probability of DR by 0.057 to 0.065, and cutting the ER probability by around 0.02.
The net effect of having more prevalent job-based benefits is to increase the likelihood
of people staying on to normal retirement age, and the magnitudes are larger than other
terms. This finding underscores the importance of integrating both governmentprovided and company-supplied benefits in models of retirement pathways.
Table 5 here
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Simulating Responses to Cutting Early Retirement Benefits
To further assess how peoples’ retirement patterns might change in response to
cuts in early retirement Social Security benefits, we next combine estimated parameters
with computed wealth changes to conduct specific simulations.
Impact of Early Retirement Benefit Cuts
Responses to Social Security benefit cuts are derived by simulating how
retirement probabilities might change if the present value of only the early retirement
Social Security benefit were cut by $25,000. An early benefit cut of this magnitude for
the median HRS respondent would represent about a 15 percent lower monthly
payment over the retiree’s remaining lifetime. Since this experiment only alters the
early retirement benefit, it represents a kinking of the lifetime budget constraint, leaving
unchanged the DR and NR wealth while lowering ER wealth.
The results in Table 6 indicate how our empirical model would predict that
workers would respond. Fewer people would elect early retirement, and the response is
on the order of a 0.025 reduction of the likelihood of taking ER. Conversely, more
people would be predicted to opt for both NR and DR. The movement to DR is in all
cases smaller than the move to NR, with less than half as many moving to disability
retirement as compared to normal retirement (0.006 versus 0.018). In general,
however, it is interesting to note that the magnitudes of the simulated response
magnitudes are quite small, particularly given the relatively large size of the simulated
benefit cut.
Table 6 here
What if Early Benefits Were Disallowed Altogether?
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As an alternative to the benefit reductions described above, one could
alternatively ask how retirement patterns might change if Social Security early
retirement benefits were eliminated altogether. Of course, people with adequate other
income could still exit the labor force at a young age, but under this scenario, they could
not receive Social Security early benefits. To simulate how people might respond to
such a change, we use the estimated coefficients described above, eliminate the choice
of interest (the ER path), and then evaluate equation (5) above for DR and NR.32 The
results appear in the second row of Table 6 which reports predicted changes in the
probability of the DR and the NR paths if ER were to be eliminated. The anticipated
flow from early retirement to the disability retirement path (0.108) is less than half the
size of the flow to normal retirement (0.228). The simulated patterns are virtually
identical across models, consistent with results reported above.33
Who Moves Where
The simulation results agree closely across models yet their effects may differ
across people of different characteristics. Table 7 explores this possibility by examining
changes in the predicted probabilities of selecting the DR pathway under the simulation
experiment, relating it to some of the sociodemographic characteristics of most interest
for policy purposes.
Table 7 here
The estimation shows that several factors are associated with the probability of
moving away from an ER retirement pathway toward DR. For instance, people who
report themselves to be in poor health are more likely to move to DR, reflecting their
higher probability of medical eligibility. Employer benefits also play an important role:
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those with company-sponsored health and disability insurance have lower probabilities
of moving to DR. However, those with retiree health coverage and pensions are more
likely to move to DR. Apparently, workers with employer benefits are more likely
candidates for DR than those without.

Conclusions
In this study we ask how reducing early retirement benefits under Social Security
might change older workers’ life cycle wealth and retirement pathways. The model is a
life-cycle one, modeling the choice of retirement options as a function of the expected
present value of wealth and leisure associated with each pathway. We use the HRS
linked with invaluable administrative records to account for the various income sources
available to older workers, including Social Security benefits and employer-sponsored
pensions as well as job-based health insurance and disability benefits.
We find that respondents who retire early are quite similar at baseline to those
who subsequently elect the NR path, in terms of their health, education, and wealth.
Both groups are, however, healthier and better educated than those who later end up
on disability retirement. Analysis of the life-cycle budget constraint shows that cutting
early Social Security benefits has an uneven effect on the distribution of beneficiaries.
Respondents who are black, have low educational attainment, and are in poor health,
suffer relatively large losses. Our policy experiment also indicates that early Social
Security benefit cuts would have relatively small effects on the probability of early
retirement. If early retirement benefits were to be eliminated, more than twice as many
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HRS respondents would be predicted to work to normal retirement as opposed to taking
disability benefits.
In future work we plan to extend the analysis in several directions. We will
evaluate the DI application and acceptance process in more detail, and will extend the
model allow for additional retirement states. We can also relax the conditional Logit
framework to allow more general preference structures though our prior research
(Fields and Mitchell 1984) using older datasets found that this did not materially change
conclusions. At present, we conclude that Social Security early retirement benefit cuts
would induce more workers to delay benefit acceptance as opposed to taking disability
benefits.

Version of 9/6/00

21

Table 1: Background Characteristics of HRS Estimation Sample, Overall
and by Retirement Pathway ($1992)
Retirement Pathway
Variable
Total
DR
ER
NR
Demographic
Age (years)
59.4
59.0
59.5
59.3
Female (%)
48
55
50
43
Currently Married (%)
77
67
78
75
Partner (not married) (%)
2
3
1
2
Ever Divorced (%)
28
38
26
29
Ever Widowed (%)
10
18
10
9
Never Married (%)
4
4
4
4
Black (%)
7
16
6
7
Education
LT HS (%)
24
52
25
17
High School (%)
36
31
37
34
GT HS (%)
40
17
37
49
Health Status
Work Limiting Disability (%)
13
42
14
10
Self Report of Health:
Excellent (%)
25
5
24
28
Very Good (%)
33
14
34
35
Good (%)
28
30
28
29
Fair (%)
10
32
11
7
Poor (%)
3
19
3
1
Difficulty with ADL (%)
12
28
12
9
Doctor-diagnosed Conditions:
Arthritis (%)
40
58
40
39
Cancer (%)
7
7
7
6
Diabetes (%)
10
31
10
9
Heart Problems (%)
14
29
15
10
High Blood Pressure (%)
41
54
40
42
Lung Disease (%)
6
12
7
5
Mental Problems (%)
8
13
8
7
Stroke (%)
2
6
2
3
CES Depression Score
21.2
25.3
21.2
20.7
Poor Vision (%)
1
3
1
1
Poor Hearing (%)
2
0
3
2
N of Observations
1,544
63
951
530
%
100
4
62
34

Source: Authors’ computations using weighted HRS data; see text for sample and
Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 2: Median 10% of Wealth by Source and Retirement Pathway ($1992)
Retirement Pathway
Variable
Total
DR
ER
NR
Social Security:
DI Insured, Wave 1 (%)
85
97
82
88
PV SSDR Wealth
$89,992 $76,786 $89,843
$91,379
PV SSER Wealth
$162,133 $117,855 $164,972
$161,709
PV SSNR Wealth
$174,353 $128,067 $176,910
$172,999
Job-based Wealth:*
Employed, Wave 1 (%)
77
72
70
90
Job Health Ins. (%)
50
51
47
53
Job Disability Ins. (%)
44
44
39
51
Retiree Health Ins. (%)
44
40
47
39
PV Earnings to 62
$29,645 $27,708 $23,437
$41,677
PV Earnings to 65
$73,956 $62,791 $58,975
$98,957
Live Pension (%)
40
42
35
50
Pension (%)
68
66
67
70
PV DI Pension
$54,970 $68,702 $48,827
$62,559
PV ER Pension
$53,265 $68,173 $48,627
$60,524
PV NR Pension
$57,663 $70,054 $50,684
$79,191
Other Wealth:
Housing Wealth
$50,388 $31,540 $54,366
$48,584
Other Financial Wealth
$58,865 $14,704 $63,492
$59,579
Spouse Wealth
$17,775
$1,894
$16,510
$23,967
Total Retirement Wealth:
PV Total DR Wealth
$451,111 $333,868 $437,945
$483,899
PV Total ER Wealth
$522,365 $396,282 $518,592
$543,902
PV Total NR Wealth
$611,191 $470,029 $603,664
$644,902
Notes: See Table 1.
* Job based health, retiree health, and disability insurance statistics from Wave 1 job.
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Table 3: Wealth Impact of Social Security
Early Retirement Benefit Reductions
Variables
Sociodemographi
c
Female
Black
Married
LT HS
Health Bad
Work-Related
Work in 1992
Retire HI
Job HI
Job DI
Pension
DI Insured

OLS Coefficient
(|Standard Error|)

-0.01
(0.01)
-0.05**
(0.01)
0.08**
(0.01)
-0.03**
(0.01)
-0.08**
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
1,544
0.32

N of Observations
R-squared
Notes: See Table 1.
** t>=1.96, * t>= 1.65.
The dependent variable is the change in the
level of retirement wealth after the early
retirement benefit cut. Equations include a
constant term.
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Table 4: Factors Influencing Choice of Retirement Pathway:
Estimated Logit Coefficients (|SE|)

Variable
Wealth
Leisure
Leisure*PoorHealth
Wealth*Job Health Ins
Wealth*Job Disab Ins
Wealth*Retiree Health
Ins

Model
(1)
1.69**
[.21]
0.12
[0.14]

Model
(2)
1.75**
[0.21]
0.04
[0.14]
1.09
[0.71]

Model
(3)
1.75**
[0.21]
0.09
[0.14]
1.06
[0.84]

Model
(4)
0.59*
[0.25]
0.16
[0.14]
0.96
[0.67]
1.94**
[0.50]
1.68**
[0.54]
-0.18
[0.56]

Likelihood Ratio Tests
(chi 2):
vs Model 1
-3.42
1.88
49.26**
vs Model 2
---52.69**
Outcomes
4,447
4,447
4,447
4,447
Observations
1,544
1,544
1,544
1,544
LL
-1582.20 -1580.49 -1581.26 -1555.86
Chi-square
78.09** 81.52** 79.97** 130.78**
Notes: See Table 1.
** t>= 1.96; * t>= 1.65
Poor health: Self-report fair/poor in Eqs (2) and (4) and Any ADL in Eq.
(3)
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Table 5. Impact of Changes in Explanatory Variables on Retirement Pathways
Change in Explanatory
Variable

? Predicted Probability from ? Explanatory Variable

? P(DR)
? P(ER)
? P(NR)
$25K Increase in Wealth
0.003
0.002
-0.005
+1 year Increase in Leisure
0.000
-0.004
0.004
Poor Health vs Not
0.022
0.011
-0.033
Job Health Ins. vs None
-0.065
-0.024
0.089
Job Disability Ins. vs None
-0.057
-0.020
0.077
Retiree Health Ins. vs None
0.006
0.002
-0.008
Notes: See Table 1. Estimates calculated using Model 4 from Table 3. Impact
computed by setting categorical variables to 0 versus 1 for all respondents. Impacts for
continuous variables estimated at $25,000 increase for wealth and 1-year increase for
leisure.
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Table 6. Predicted Changes in the Probability of DR and NR given Cuts in Early
Retirement Benefits
Policy
Simulation

? Predicted Probability from ? SSER Policy
? P(DR)
? P(ER)
? P(NR)

Early Retirement Penalty

0.006

-0.025

0.018

Elimination of Early Retirement
Benefits

0.108

--

0.228

Notes: See Table 1. Calculations use estimates from Model 4 from Table 3. Impacts
for ER benefit reduction computed by reducing estimated SSER wealth by $25,000. If
respondent has less than $25,000 in SSER wealth, then their SSER wealth is set to
zero. Impacts for the elimination of SSER calculated by eliminating the ER option and
recalculating predicted probabilities (see text for more details).
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Table 7. Factors Associated with
Changes in Probability of DR If Early
Retirement Benefit Cut
OLS Coefficient
(|SE|)
Female
0.000
(0.002)
Black
-0.005
(0.003)
Married
0.006**
(0.003)
LT HS
-0.004
(0.002)
Employed in 1992
0.000
(0.002)
Job Health Ins
-0.044**
(0.003)
Job Disab Ins
-0.050**
(0.002)
Retiree Health Ins
0.009**
(0.002)
Poor Health
0.013**
(0.004)
Any Pension
0.007**
(0.002)
N of observations
817
R-squared
0.72
Note: Dependent variable is ?P(DR) given elimination of the ER option; estimates of
?P(DR) from Model 4, Table 3. Recalculated predicted probabilities derived as in text.
Variable
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Figure 1: OASDI Insured Status for HRS Respondents by Age and Sex
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Source: Authors’ computations, weighted HRS; see text and Appendix.
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Figure 2: OASDI Insured Status by Early Retirement Wealth Decile
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Source: Authors’ computations, weighted HRS; see text and Appendix.
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Figure 3: Wealth Impact of Cutting Early Social Security Benefits by $25,000
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sample Means
Note: All RHS variables measured as of Wave 1
AnyADL: =1 if respondent finds it “difficult” to complete any ADL, 0 else.
Age: Respondent’s age in years.
Black: =1 if respondent black, 0 else.
CES Depression: respondent’s CESD score.
Live Pension: =1 if has a pension on current job, 0 else.
DI Insured, Wave 1: =1 if respondent DI insured based on administrative data, 0 else.
Doctor Diagnosed Condition: =1 if respondent reported a condition diagnosed by an
MD, 0 else.
Female: =1 if respondent female, 0 else.
Housing Wealth: $ value of home net equity
Job Health Ins: =1 if respondent had employer-provided health insurance, 0 else.
Job Disab Ins: =1 if respondent had employer-provided long-term disability insurance, 0
else
Leisure
ij: Years of leisure remaining to person i conditional on selecting retirement
path j.
LT HS: =1 of respondent had less than a high school education, 0 else.
Married: =1 if respondent married currently, 0 else.
OA Insured: =1 if respondent OA insured based on administrative data, 0 else.
Other Financial Wealth: $ value of other financial wealth
Pension: =1 if has a pension on current or from past job, 0 else.
Poor Vision: =1 if respondent reported having poor vision, 0 else.
Poor Hearing: =1 if respondent reported having poor hearing, 0 else.
Poor Health: =1 if respondent self-reported fair or poor health, 0 else.
PV DR Wealth: $ value of expected total wealth if respondent elected DR.
PV ER Wealth: $ value of expected total wealth if respondent elected ER.
PV NR Wealth: $ value of expected total wealth if respondent elected NR.
PV Earnings to 62: PV of expected earnings if work to 62
PV Earnings to 65: PV of expected earnings if work to 65
PV DR Pension: $ value of wealth from employer-provided disability pension
PV ER Pension: $ value of wealth from employer-provided early retirement pension
PV NR Pension: $ value of wealth from employer-provided normal retirement pension
PV SSDR: $ value of expected Social Security wealth if respondent elected DR.
PV SSER: $ value of expected Social Security wealth if respondent elected ER.
PV SSNR: $ value of expected Social Security wealth if respondent elected NR.
Retiree Health Ins: =1 if respondent had employer-provided retiree health insurance, 0
else
Spouse Wealth: $ expected value of spouse pension (if any)
Wealth ij: PV of expected wealth available to person i conditional on selecting retirement
path j.
Work in 1992: =1 if respondent has a job in 1992, 0 else.
Work Limiting Disability: =1 if respondent reported some work limiting disability, 0 else.
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Appendix Table: Background Characteristics of Full EBS/HRS Estimation
Sample, Overall and by Retirement Pathway ($1992)
Retirement Pathway
Variable
Total
DR
ER
NR
Demographic
Age (years)
59.4
59.0
59.5
59.2
Female (%)
53
58
56
49
Currently Married (%)
77
60
79
76
Partner (not married) (%)
1
2
1
2
Ever Divorced (%)
26
42
25
27
Ever Widowed (%)
10
18
10
9
Never Married (%)
4
5
4
4
Black (%)
7
15
6
7
Education
LT HS (%)
24
53
26
18
High School (%)
37
34
39
33
GT HS (%)
39
13
35
49
Health Status
Work Limiting Disability (%)
16
51
15
12
Self Report of Health:
Excellent (%)
24
3
23
27
Very Good (%)
32
15
34
34
Good (%)
28
27
28
28
Fair (%)
12
30
12
9
Poor (%)
4
25
4
2
Difficulty with ADL (%)
14
36
13
11
Doctor-diagnosed Conditions:
Arthritis (%)
42
64
42
41
Cancer (%)
6
6
7
6
Diabetes (%)
11
28
10
10
Heart Problems (%)
14
26
15
11
High Blood Pressure (%)
41
54
40
42
Lung Disease (%)
7
16
7
6
Mental Problems (%)
9
13
9
9
Stroke (%)
2
6
2
3
CES Depression Score
21.5
25.8
21.4
21
Poor Vision (%)
2
9
2
1
Poor Hearing (%)
2
0
3
2
Total PDV of Wealth by Benefit Type
DI Insured, Wave 1 (%)
74
66
72
71
OA Insured, Wave 1 (%)
83
87
87
79
PV Total DR Wealth
$423,525 $201,745 $409,022 $477,340
PV Total ER Wealth
$507,660 $262,987 $504,758 $541,819
PV Total NR Wealth
$586,040 $315,080 $582,628 $626,536
N of Observations
1,843
92
1,092
659
%
100
5
59
36

Source: Authors’ computations, weighted HRS; see text.
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Endnotes:
1

Similar findings appear in Uccello (1998), CBO (1999), and USGAO (1999).

2

See Dwyer and Mitchell (1999), Manton et al (1997), Crimmins et al. (1997),

Burkhauser, Couch and Phillips (1996), and Smith (1999).
3

For a review see Bound and Burkhauser (1999); see also Benitez-Silva et al. (2000).

4

For a recent review of the retirement literature, see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).

5

To illustrate this point in more detail, Gruber’s (1996) single-period perspective

assumes that retirement responses to the DI change was not influenced by another
concurrent change in the benefit structure, namely a lowering of the early retirement
age to 60. A more general model would include not only current DI benefits but also the
enhancement of the early retirement option if retirement were delayed. A similar
approach is followed by Friedberg (1999) who examines the effect of a precursor
program to Social Security, the means-tested U.S. Old Age Assistance program.
6

For sophisticated descriptions of SSDI program rules see Hu et. al (1997), Hoynes

and Moffitt (1997), and Gruber and Kubik (1997), particularly with regard to how SSDI
might affect younger recipients’ incentives to return to work. In this paper we do not
incorporate this possibility since older recipients rarely return to work after becoming DI
beneficiaries.
7

To be fully insured for retirement benefits at age 62 or older, the worker must have 40

QC’s (quarters of coverage). QC’s are awarded based on having had covered earnings
of at least a threshold amount each year. Spouses of fully insured workers are eligible
for a spousal benefit regardless of their own work history. Coverage, eligibility, and
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benefit rules relevant to the HRS cohorts in question appear on the Social Security
Administration’s web page (www.ssa.gov) or in SSA (1992).
8

Also to be “disability insured” the worker must (1) have at least 6 QC’s and (2) have 1

QC for each year from age 22 to the age of disability (assuming he or she is age 31 or
older; special rules apply to younger workers).
9

A worker could be fully but not DI insured if he had at least ten years of work (so he is

fully insured) but lost his disability insurance status due to periods of illness or
unemployment.
10

The AIME involves indexing a worker’s earnings between 22 and 62 after dropping

the 5 lowest years. Indexation links actual covered earnings in a given year to average
covered earnings in the same year, and these are then brought forward to the point
when the worker is age 60 (earnings after age 60 are entered in nominal rather than
indexed form). The PIA formula then applies a 3-tier replacement rate formula to the
indexed earnings; the first replacement rate is 90%, the second 32% and the third, 15%.
Cost-of-living adjustments are applied from the PIA calculation year to the retirement
year.
11

Legally, the OASDI system defines disability as “the inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted and can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months” (SSA 1992).
There is also a five-month waiting period after the onset of disability until the person can
apply for benefits.

Version of 9/6/00

39

12

DI beneficiaries can also receive Medicare 24 months after receiving benefits;

accordingly an age-62 DI beneficiary may get Medicare about a year earlier than could
an early retiree.
13

In this study we assume that the probability of receiving DI benefits conditional on

application is around 49%, consistent with the average benefit receipt rate reported over
the 1990’s (Social Security, 1999).
14

Because of the confidential nature of the administrative data, researchers may access

them only under restricted conditions; see www.umich.edu/~hrswww for details. These
files were obtained for a majority of HRS respondents, namely those providing
permission to link their survey data with administrative records supplied by the Social
Security Administration and also with pension plan descriptions provided by
respondents’ employers. In a few cases Social Security benefits could not be
calculated so the respondent had to be omitted from the analysis. One reason for
missing Social Security benefits was that respondents gave permission for the
University of Michigan to request their Social Security records, but no match was
obtained because their records did not match SSA identification information. Also some
age-eligible respondents declined to sign the release form permitting their Social
Security data to be matched with the HRS (a handful of the very wealthy, some Blacks,
and some Hispanics did not provide consent). Omission of nonmatch cases might bias
results if those who had a matched file differ from those lacking a match; however
exploratory analysis finds little evidence that results are biased.
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15

In this study we use all four waves of the HRS currently available in public or

preliminary release status; special permission to link retirement outcomes with restricted
data were obtained as required.
16

The Appendix indicates characteristics of both the full and the subsamples in

question.
17

This analysis postulates that if the individual continued to work until the Social

Security early or normal retirement age, he could have continued earning on the same
pay trajectory that he was on over the five years ending in 1991. After projecting this
trajectory we ascertain whether the worker would be eligible for benefits at 62 and 65,
and then we compute what income streams he could had anticipated according to the
relevant ER and NR benefit formulas. Each of these streams is converted to a present
value stream using the survival tables and interest rates consistent with the intermediate
assumptions of the Social Security Administration. For married respondents, the
retirement benefit stream also incorporates the expected present value of spouse and
survivor benefits, as relevant. A more detailed explanation of the data creation effort for
Social Security benefit amounts appears in Mitchell, Olson and Steinmeier (2000).
18

For more information regarding patterns in eligibility for Social Security benefits, see

Levine et al. (2000).
19

We apply a constant rather than a state-specific probability of eligibility for DI since

HRS respondents’ state residence codes are not provided in the dataset, unlike Gruber
and Kubik (1997) who use state variation in SSDI denial rates. On the other hand, they
lack administrative records to determine whether individual respondents are eligible for
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benefits, and how much actual benefits are at the micro level. Hu et al (1997) have a
detailed description of the DI determination process.
20

For detail on the construction of the pension benefit stream data, see Gustman et al.

(2000).
21

In many corporate pension plans there are special provisions entitling a disabled

worker to more generous payments, or benefits payable earlier than otherwise would be
the case. To examine this pattern in more detail, we use the pension plan algorithms
available from HRS to construct present values of income streams for workers judged to
be entitled to disability benefits from their firms. Many employer disability plans grant
company-based disability pensions to any worker deemed eligible for SSDI, so in
constructing the budget constraint we assume that the eligibility probability is the same
for SSDI as for company disability pensions. SSDI is not means tested, so a worker
judged disabled could receive both corporate and government benefits.
22

Moore and Mitchell (2000) find that pension wealth is on the order of $150,000-

200,000 for those in the HRS sample with pensions.
23

Entries in Table 2 are computed for the median 10% so components will not sum to

the totals.
24

This analysis does not consider the possibility of people applying for Supplemental

Security Insurance benefits when early retirement benefits are cut though there might
be some program substitution in this direction. We suggest that this is not likely to be a
large group inasmuch as many (over half) of those currently eligible for SSI do not seek
out the benefits they are currently entitled to.
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25

If benefit present values were too small, benefits were set to zero in the relevant

experiments.
26

As noted above, the dollar gap does not always correlate with percentage changes in

wealth. For instance, though blacks and those in poor health would experience smaller
dollar changes, they are more likely to have low post- relative to pre-experiment ER
wealth (results not provided in detail here).
27

Modeling the budget constraint so as to include both public and private disability

insurance benefits therefore extends the “peak value” concept popularized by Coile and
Gruber (1999) in the Social Security context.
28

For married couples the formulation of the budget constraint is somewhat more

complex since spouses are entitled to social security and pension benefits, and survivor
benefits. The empirical work incorporates these as well.
29

This health measure has been found to be useful in retirement modeling; see Dwyer

and Mitchell (1999).
30

Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the addition of health and job variables significantly

increases the explanatory power of Models 4 relative to Models 1 and 2; see Table 4.
31

We show results from Model 4 only because the likelihood ratio tests suggest that

Model 4 has the most explanatory power. Nevertheless Table 5 results are consistent
with those obtained using other models in Table 4.
32

Specifically we have:

( 6) P ′(Yi = 1 | Yi = 1 or 3) =

and
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exp[αˆLi1 + βˆYRET i1 ]
exp[αˆLi1 + βˆYRET i1 ] + exp[αˆLi3 + βˆYRETi 3 ]
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( 7)

P′′′(Yi = 3 | Yi = 1 or 3) =

exp[αˆLi3 + βˆYRETi 3 ]
.
exp[ αˆLi1 + βˆYRET i1 ] + exp[αˆLi 3 + βˆYRET i3 ]

Given this outcome, the effect of eliminating the option on the probability of choosing
DR or NR is computed as:
(8) dP NOER = P ′(Yi = 1) − P(Yi = 1)
(9 ) dP NOER = P′′′(Yi = 3) − P(Yi = 3)

for DR and NR, respectively. See Allison (1999) for a similar application of this
approach.
33

The results are virtually identical if we limit analysis to those who are eligible for DR,

ER, and NR benefits at the outset of the panel data period.
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